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Impacts of CO2 Mandates for New Cars in the European Union 
Sergey Paltsev*†, Y.-H. Henry Chen*, Valerie Karplus*, Paul Kishimoto* and John Reilly* 
Abstract 
CO2 emissions mandates for new light-duty passenger vehicles have recently been adopted in the 
European Union (EU), which require steady reductions to 95 g CO2/km in 2021. Using a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model, we analyze the impact of the mandates on oil demand, CO2 
emissions, and economic welfare, and compare the results to an emission trading scenario that 
achieves identical emissions reductions. We find that the mandates lower oil expenditures by about 
€6 billion, but at a net added cost of €12 billion in 2020. Emissions from transport are about 
50MtCO2 lower with the vehicle emission standards, but with the economy-wide emission trading, 
lower emissions in transport allow an equal increase in emissions elsewhere in the economy. We 
estimate that tightening CO2 standards further after 2020 would cost the EU economy an additional 
€24–63 billion in 2025 compared with achieving the same reductions with an economy-wide emission 
trading system. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
European Union legislation sets mandatory CO2 emissions reduction targets for new cars  
(EC, 2009). The legislation is based on the EU strategy for passenger cars and light commercial 
vehicles that is at once aimed at fighting climate change, reducing the EU reliance on imported 
fuels, and improving air quality (EC, 2007). It sets a new vehicle fleet average for passenger cars 
of 130 grams of CO2 per kilometer (g/km) for 2015 (phased in from 2012), falling to 95 g/km by 
2021. The 2007 new car fleet average was about 159 g/km (EC, 2014). The goal of this paper is 
to assess the resulting CO2 emissions, energy, and economic impacts of the EU CO2 mandates, 
and compare them to an alternative scenario where vehicle emissions are part of an emission 
trading system designed to meet Europe’s announced economy-wide targets. Most analyses to 
date have been based on simplified benefit–cost calculations that estimate fuel savings and 
additional costs of introducing new technology deployment driven by the targets (e.g. TNO, 
2011; Ricardo-AEA, 2014; ICCT, 2014a). We argue that assessment of the performance of the 
EU targets and alternatives should account for interactions of the transport sector with other 
energy sectors and with other parts of the economy. For this purpose we apply a global, 
economy-wide model of energy and emissions. The MIT Economic Projection and Policy 
Analysis (EPPA) model (Paltsev et al., 2005), in the version applied here, includes a 
technology-rich representation of the passenger vehicle transport sector and its substitution with 
purchased modes, as documented in Karplus et al. (2013a).  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss some fuel economy standard basics 
and describe in more detail the European standards. In Section 3 we describe the model used for 
the analysis. In Section 4 we implement a scenario analysis to study the effects of the EU CO2 
standards for passenger cars. Section 5 summarizes the results and conclusions. 
2. FUELS STANDARDS BASICS AND THE EUROPEAN REQUIREMENTS 
Tailpipe CO2 emissions standards, as adopted in Europe, are similar to fuel economy 
standards such as the US Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards, which date to the 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (US EPCA, 1975). Fuel use per mile or kilometer, 
the target in fuel economy standards, translates directly to CO2 emissions given the carbon 
content of the fuel. For example, 95 g/km is equivalent to 4.1 liters of gasoline per 
100 kilometers (l/km) or 57.4 miles per gallon (mpg) of gasoline. In general, however, there is a 
gap between test standards and actual on-road performance of vehicles. A direct translation of 
targets between countries is further complicated as it also should reflect the mix of gasoline and 
diesel cars in each country because they have different fuel efficiencies. The ICCT (2014a) 
estimates that the 95 g/km target for the EU is equivalent to 3.8 l/km (considering a mix of 
gasoline and diesel cars) and to about 62 mpg in the US specification (considering the 
differences between the EU and US test standards). 
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2.1 Fuel Economy Standard Basics  
Emissions and fuel economy standards have become a popular regulatory mechanism, with 
many countries setting such targets despite economists’ questioning of their effectiveness (ICCT, 
2014a; Karplus et al., 2015). An initial issue is the translation of targets defined by a specific test 
cycle to actual fuel use or emissions reductions. Test cycle settings differ among jurisdictions 
(e.g., Europe and the US) and differ from actual driving habits. The conditions under which the 
tests are conducted can also differ from actual road and environmental conditions. Currently, 
actual on-road fuel consumption exceeds the test results by about 20% in the US (EPA, 2014) 
and about 30% in the EU (ICCT, 2014b). 
Standards also often include other credits that relax the actual target, or manufacturers may 
find it less costly to simply pay noncompliance penalties. In the US and EU, credits are available 
for reductions of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) used as refrigerants in air conditioning. Anderson 
and Sallee (2011) also point to the extensive use of credits for flex-fuel vehicles, an exception in 
recent US CAFE standards. The spread of flex-fuel vehicles was an objective of the legislation, 
anticipating a growing supply of ethanol, which would reduce oil imports and CO2 emissions. As 
it turned out, however, very little of the E85 fuel (an 85% ethanol blend) was available and so 
most of these flex vehicles continued to use petroleum-based fuels with no benefit to fuel 
imports or CO2 emissions. While exceptions in legislation may or may not achieve the expected 
objective, they relax the actual vehicle emission standard and can substantially reduce the 
estimated compliance costs (Anderson and Sallee, 2011).   
While adjustments can be made to the stated standard to better estimate their effectiveness, 
economists’ concern is that the standards can actually affect consumer behavior, reducing fuel or 
emissions savings. To the extent the vehicles are more costly, the sales of efficient new vehicles 
may be reduced and old vehicles may be retained in the fleet longer. New cars that are purchased 
that meet efficiency standards have lower fuel costs per distance traveled, and that may lead to 
an increase in travel—widely known as a “rebound” effect (Small and Van Dender, 2007). 
Moreover, the standards apply only to new vehicles whereas a fuel or emissions tax creates 
opportunities to reduce fuel use in the existing fleet—for instance, through changes in driving 
habits, improved vehicle maintenance, earlier retirement of older inefficient vehicles, or in the 
case of emissions, substitution of low carbon energy sources. Higher fuel prices have been 
shown to incentivize consumer purchases of more efficient vehicles, although consumer 
responses have been shown to vary across regions (Klier and Linn, 2011). Because of these 
various inefficiencies, taxes are widely considered to be the most cost-effective option for 
displacing petroleum-based fuel use. Despite the advantages, fuel taxes have failed to gain 
political traction in the United States (Knittel, 2012). Europe, on the other hand, already has 
among the highest fuel taxes in the world, and opposition to increasing the gasoline tax has been 
strong, particularly given the recent economic slowdown (Sterner, 2012). 
Regulatory processes that assess the energy, emissions, and economic impacts of these fuel 
economy programs typically rely on vehicle fleet and technology models that do not capture 
behavioral impacts or broader macroeconomic effects. Regulatory impact assessments in the 
 
 
4 
United States (EPA, 2012a, 2012b) have focused on the new vehicle fleet and have not assessed 
impacts on fleet turnover, non-transport sectors, or global oil price and quantity demanded. In the 
European Union, EUCLIMIT—an economy-wide model for Europe—has been used with broad 
sectoral coverage and fleet dynamics; however, international variables are still assumed to be 
exogenous (Eur-Lex, 2012). 
A reason frequently given for implementing or tightening new vehicle fuel economy 
standards is that consumers underestimate the value of fuel savings over the life of the car, and 
therefore are unwilling to pay extra for efficiency at the time of vehicle purchase, requiring 
correction through policy (Greene et al., 2005). Recent work has tested this hypothesis. One 
study suggests that consumers that are indifferent between one dollar in fuel costs and 76 cents in 
vehicle purchase price (Allcott and Wozny, 2012), suggesting mild undervaluation, while other 
empirical work finds scant evidence of consumer myopia (Goldberg, 1998; Knittel et al., 2013). 
Their work suggests that consumers respond rationally to price mechanisms like carbon taxes or 
gasoline taxes, leaving little need for additional policy intervention as prices influence both what 
cars people buy and how much people drive.  
Comparison of emission trading and fuel economy standards include that of Rausch and 
Karplus (2014), who find that in the US, an emission trading system is more efficient than 
vehicle emission standards. Paltsev et al. (2014) considered a sequential policy design, where 
global emissions were first regulated in electricity and private transportation, but then later were 
combined with economy-wide emissions trading. Economy-wide emissions trading reduced the 
cost of mitigation. 
Ellerman et al. (2006) examined possible links between CAFE standards in the US with a 
proposed emission trading system. They concluded that in the presence of an overall carbon cap, 
the CAFE standards are a poor regulatory policy for dealing with carbon emissions, whether or 
not it is integrated with the emission trading system. A useful aspect of their study is discussion 
of the practical steps needed to bring transportation under emissions trading in a cost-effective 
manner that engages both upstream (fuel provider) and downstream (car owner) actors. 
2.2 European Vehicle Standards 
The European Union has only recently pursued standards, having instead previously relied on 
fuel taxes. The new standards began with a voluntary agreement with car manufacturers to 
achieve 140 g/km for new vehicles sold in 2008–2009. The standard became mandatory when 
legislation required a fleet average of 130 g/km for all new passenger cars registered in the EU in 
2015 (EC, 2009). The legislation included a so-called “limit value curve”, allowing heavier cars 
to have higher emissions than lighter cars while preserving the overall fleet average. A target of 
95 g/km was specified for the year 2020, with full implementation later delayed to 2021. In 2014 
the European Parliament’s Environmental Committee issued a report calling for a 2025 target in 
the range of 68 to 78 g/km (EPRS, 2014). In 2014 the EU issued a regulation (EU, 2014) that the 
vehicle CO2 target should be achieved “in a cost-effective manner.” 
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A summary of historic, enacted and proposed CO2 emission reductions through 2025 for new 
cars in the EU is shown in Figure 1, with the US standards shown for comparison. Historically, 
the average EU cars are more fuel-efficient (and produce less tailpipe CO2 emissions per 
kilometer) than US cars, which economists would likely attribute to higher fuel taxes in the EU. 
Differential fuel taxes for diesel and gasoline have also contributed to a much larger penetration 
of diesel cars, which have higher fuel efficiency in liters per kilometer. The US standards are 
specified through 2025, but they are enacted only up through the 2021 model year, with a 
mid-term review of the standards scheduled to take place in 2017. 
As mentioned previously, the EU currently sets two targets for new cars: 130 g/km in 2015 
and 95 g/km in 2021. A gradual phase-in of the targets is achieved by increasing the percentage 
of the new vehicle fleet to which they apply. By 2020, 95% of new cars have to comply with the 
95 g/km target which, according to ICCT (2014a), makes it effectively a 98 g/km target for 2020. 
Full compliance must be achieved by 2021. In Figure 1 the requirements are drawn as a simple 
linear approximation between the 2015 and 2020 targets, with the range under discussion for 
2025 also shown. 
 
Figure 1. CO2 regulations for cars in USA and EU normalized to the EU NEDC test cycle. Data source: 
ICCT (2014a), EPRS (2014). 
Based on data of the European Environment Agency (EEA, 2014), in 2013 the fleet average 
for new cars was 127 g/km, falling below the 2015 standard, even though the phase-in schedule 
required that only 75% of newly-registered cars in 2013 meet the 130 g/km target. While 
seemingly good news, the EU system of testing cars to measure fuel economy and CO2 
emissions shows a growing gap between the test results and on-road performance of cars. The 
ICCT (2014b) estimates the divergence has grown from 8% in 2001 to 31% in 2013. Transport 
& Environment (2014) estimates that without action the divergence is likely to grow to over 50% 
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by 2020. Applying the 31% difference to the 2013 test results leads to about 166 g/km for the 
actual performance of new cars. The growing difference between test results and on-road 
performance is a concern both in the EU and US, and changes have been proposed for the testing 
and labeling of cars to better represent the fuel economy drivers are likely to experience (EPA, 
2014). Efforts such as ours, to estimate cost and effectiveness of such measures, must reflect as 
best they can the relationship between test standards and the likely actual on-road performance of 
vehicles. If the standards are taken at face value, costs of compliance and effectiveness will be 
overestimated. On the other hand, if test standards are changed to better reflect actual 
performance, the cost and effectiveness of the standards will be underestimated.  
3. MODEL AND SCENARIOS 
We approach analysis of the European standards using a global energy–economic model, with 
detail on vehicle options for fuel saving and their costs, which is capable of capturing rebound 
and leakage effects while estimating fuel savings, emissions reductions, and economic costs of 
the regulations. We capture leakage that occurs across sectors within economies, across regions, 
and between new and used passenger vehicles. The rebound effect is also captured, and based on 
parameterization of the costs associated with vehicle efficiency improvements, the contribution 
of resulting fuel savings given diverse taxation regimes for motor vehicle fuel, and heterogeneity 
in vehicle ownership and travel demand patterns. The model further captures how these two 
effects interact with each other. 
3.1 Model Description 
We use the MIT Economic Projection and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model (Paltsev et al., 
2005; Karplus et al., 2013a) for the analysis. It provides a multi-region, multi-sector recursive 
dynamic representation of the global economy. Data on production, consumption, intermediate 
inputs, international trade, energy and taxes for the base year of 2004 are from the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) dataset (Narayanan and Walmsley, 2008). The GTAP dataset is 
aggregated into 16 regions (Table 1) and 24 sectors, including several advanced technology 
sectors parameterized with supplementary engineering cost data. The model includes 
representation of CO2 and non-CO2 (methane, CH4; nitrous oxide, N2O; hydrofluorocarbons, 
HFCs; perfluorocarbons, PFCs; and sulphur hexafluoride, SF6) greenhouse gas emissions 
abatement, and calculates reductions from gas-specific control measures as well as those 
occurring as a byproduct of actions directed at CO2. The model also tracks major air pollutants 
(sulfates, SOx; nitrogen oxides, NOx; black carbon, BC; organic carbon, OC; carbon monoxide, 
CO; ammonia, NH3; and non-methane volatile organic compounds, VOCs). The data on GHG 
and air pollutants are documented in Waugh et al. (2011).  
From 2005 the model solves at 5-year intervals, with economic growth and energy use for 
2005–2015 calibrated to data and short-term projections from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF, 2014) and the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2014). The model includes a 
technology-rich representation of the passenger vehicle transport sector and its substitution with 
purchased modes including aviation, rail, and marine transport (Paltsev et al., 2004). Several 
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features were incorporated into the EPPA model to explicitly represent passenger vehicle 
transport sector detail (Karplus et al., 2013a). These features include an empirically-based 
parameterization of the relationship between income growth and demand for vehicle miles 
traveled (VMT), a representation of fleet turnover, and opportunities for fuel use and emissions 
abatement, including representation of electric vehicles. The opportunities for fuel efficiency 
improvement are parameterized based on data from the U.S Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA, 2010; EPA, 2012b) as described in Karplus (2011), Karplus and Paltsev (2012), and 
Karplus et al. (2013b). 
 
Table 1. Sectors and regions in the EPPA model. 
 Sectors Regions 
No
n-
En
er
gy
 
Agriculture Europe (EUR) 
Forestry United States (USA) 
Energy-Intensive Products Canada (CAN) 
Other Industries Products Japan (JPN) 
Industrial Transportation Mexico (MEX) 
Household Transportation Australia & Oceania (ANZ) 
Food Russia (RUS) 
Services China (CHN) 
En
er
gy
 
Coal India (IND) 
Crude Oil Brazil (BRA) 
Refined Oil Rest of Latin America (LAM) 
Natural Gas Higher-Income Asia (ASI) 
Electricity Generation Technologies Rest of East Asia (REA) 
Fossil Middle East (MES) 
Hydro Africa (AFR) 
Nuclear Rest of Europe and Central Asia (ROE) 
Solar and Wind  
Biomass  
Natural Gas Combined Cycle  
Natural Gas with CO2 Capture and Storage 
(CCS)  
Advanced Coal with CCS  
Synthetic Gas from Coal  
Hydrogen from Coal  
Hydrogen from Gas  
Oil from Shale  
Liquid Fuel from Biomass  
 
Note: Detail on aggregation of GTAP sectors and the addition of advanced technologies are provided in Paltsev et 
al. (2005). Details on the disaggregation of industrial and household transportation sectors are documented in 
Paltsev et al. (2004). 
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Given that the CO2 standards apply only to new model-year vehicles, differentiation between 
the new and used vehicle fleets is essential. We also include a parameterization of the total miles 
traveled in both new (0 to 5-year-old) and used (6 years and older) vehicles, and track changes in 
travel demand in response to changes in income as well as cost-per-kilometer. We represent the 
ability to substitute between new and used vehicles—an additional way in which consumers 
respond to changes in relative prices of vehicles and fuels as affected by the introduction of 
vehicle standards, fuel prices, or carbon prices (as they are reflected in fuel prices). Details are 
provided in Karplus et al. (2015).  
As noted, our representation of vehicle efficiency options is based on studies in the US. No 
comparable study has been done for the EU, but the cost and fuel savings associated with 
different options is, first and foremost, a matter of technology possibilities that face automakers 
worldwide. Studies in Europe include an evaluation done by TNO (2011), which relied primarily 
on the existing literature and in-house expertise. In the US study, the US EPA included extensive 
communication with car manufacturers. The budget of the EPA studies was around an order of 
magnitude higher than that of the TNO work for the EU, and the lower budget obviously limited 
what the TNO could undertake (TNO, 2011). While a detailed study of costs of efficiency 
improvements in Europe would be ideal, we believe the US study offers a reasonable estimate of 
the technical options available to manufacturers. 
The fuel economy standards are implemented in the EPPA model as constraints on the fuel 
used per kilometer of household travel. They are converted to CO2 standards based on 
characteristics of the fleet (composition of diesel and gasoline vehicles). The standards are 
imposed at their values based on ex ante usage assumptions (i.e., before any change in miles 
traveled due to the higher efficiency). This approach forces the model to simulate adoption of 
vehicle technologies that achieve the imposed standard at least cost. The production function 
specification for vehicles creates a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) nest where the 
elasticity of substitution between fuel and powertrain capital captures the increasing cost of 
marginal improvements in vehicle efficiency, holding other characteristics of the vehicle fixed 
(Karplus et al., 2013a). When simulated, tradeoffs between the power train and other 
characteristics of the vehicle, and the response of total vehicle-miles traveled due to lower 
energy costs per km are captured. The form of the utility function, the input shares, and the 
substitution elasticity between vehicle and powertrain capital determines how much the cost of 
travel changes in response to changes in the underlying CO2 requirements and vehicle 
characteristics, which in turn determines the magnitude of the rebound effect. Demand for new 
vehicles is also affected by their cost. The model assumes consumers consider fuel savings over 
the life of the vehicle, but because of the recursive-dynamic solution of the model they value 
savings according to fuel prices in the year the vehicle is purchased. With rising fuel prices, this 
implies that some undervaluation of future fuel savings can exist, with potential room for fuels 
standards to improve on these myopic decisions.  
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3.2 Scenarios 
We consider several scenarios regarding the EU CO2 emissions targets. Our “No Policy” 
scenario considers no economy-wide GHG reduction targets and no mandatory CO2 emissions 
reduction targets for new cars. It provides the basis against which we compare the outcomes of 
the other scenarios. We then consider the EU GHG reduction targets (20% reduction by 2020 
and 40% reduction by 2030 relative to 1990 levels) achieved by an economy-wide emission 
trading system (denoted as “Emission Trading”). In the Emission Trading scenario, permit 
trading is allowed across all sectors within the EU. We then create the “Current ES” scenario, 
where we add to Emission Trading the current emissions standards for vehicles of 130 g/km in 
2015 improving to 98 g/km by 2020, and holding the requirement in 2025 at the 2021 target of 
95 g/km. While the Current ES scenario is imposed on top of a system that allows trading with 
vehicle emissions, because the standards are binding on fuel economy this is equivalent to 
removing vehicles from the trading system, and adjusting the trading system to assure that 
Europe met its international commitment of 20% by 2020 and 40% by 2030, regardless of the 
vehicle emission standard requirements. We then add two scenarios that tighten targets further in 
2025: to 78 g/km (“ES78”) and to 68 g/km (“ES68”). We assume that the difference between the 
test values and on-road performance of new cars remains at 2013 levels of 30%. Table 2 
summarizes the scenarios, which we run from 2010 to 2025, at five-year time steps of the model. 
Table 2. List of scenarios. 
Name Description 
No Policy No GHG reductions and no mandatory CO2 reduction targets for new cars. 
Emission Trading Economy-wide emission trading to achieve the EU goals (20% reduction in 2020, 40% reduction in 2030 relative to 1990 levels). 
Current ES 
Current policy for Emission Standards (ES) in cars: 130 g/km in 2015, 98 
g/km in 2020, 95 g/km in 2025. The standards are imposed on top of the 
Emission Trading. 
ES78 Same as Current ES for 2015-2020, 78 g/km in 2025. 
ES68 Same as Current ES for 2015-2020, 68 g/km in 2025. 
 
For simplicity, we omit some features of the vehicle emission standard regulations that could 
loosen stringency in practice, for example, super-credits for extremely low emission vehicles and 
eco-innovations. We also assume that car manufacturers meet the standards rather than paying a 
penalty for excess emissions (set at €95 per g/km of exceedance). 
4. RESULTS 
We first describe the trends in new vehicles and the total fleet in terms of fuel economy and 
CO2 emissions per kilometer under each of the scenarios. We then describe the energy and total 
vehicle emissions implications of the each scenario. Lastly we evaluate the policy costs. 
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4.1. Impact of the Current Policies on New Cars and Total Fleet 
To illustrate how the CO2 mandate affects the efficiency of fuel use, we show projected 
on-road fuel consumption in liters per 100 km traveled of an average on-road vehicle in the new 
fleet and total vehicle fleet (Figure 2). As anticipated, we observe a declining trend in fuel 
efficiency through 2025, with declines in the total fleet lagging the new fleet as newer vintages 
of vehicles gradually replace the old vehicle stock. The model solves in 5-year time steps and so 
intervening years are linear interpolations. In 2025 new fleet is projected to have on-road fuel 
consumption of 4.9 l/km in the Current ES scenario, 4.1 l/km in the ES78 scenario, and 3.5 l/km 
in the ES68 scenario. The corresponding numbers for the total fleet in 2025 are 6.1 l/km in the 
Current ES scenario, 5.5 l/km in the ES78 scenario, and 5.1 l/km in the ES68 scenario. 
On-road CO2 emissions per kilometer for new cars and the total fleet in the Current ES 
Scenario are presented in Figure 3, along with the actual test cycle requirements. Emissions per 
kilometer follow the fuel consumption trajectory. The curves for test cycle requirements are 
lower (i.e., less emissions per km) than the new vehicles’ CO2 emissions per kilometer, reflecting 
our assumption that the on-road performance of vehicles is 30% lower (i.e., more emissions per 
km) than the test cycle. In the Current ES scenario, the mandates for new cars are set to be 
tightened from 130 g/km in 2015 to 95 g/km in 2025, while on road the new cars achieve 
169 g/km in 2015 and 123 g/km in 2025 and the total fleet performance improves from 192 g/km 
in 2015 to 152 g/km in 2025. In the ES78 and ES68 scenarios, new cars in 2025 achieve 
101 g/km and 88 g/km, respectively. The total fleet performances in 2025 in these scenarios are 
137 g/km and 127 g/km, correspondingly. 
4.2. Energy and Environmental Impacts of the Current Policies 
We now consider the net effect of the current EU CO2 vehicle emission standards on energy 
and environmental outcomes. We first focus on the change in the EU total oil consumption 
shown in Table 3. The No Policy scenario shows a slight decrease in oil use over the 2010–2025 
period. The Emission Trading scenario further reduces the total EU year-on-year oil use by 
around 23 million tonnes of oil (mtoe) in 2020 and by around 55 mtoe in 2025, about 4% and 
10% reductions relative to the No Policy scenario in 2020 and 2025, respectively. The Current 
ES scenario creates an additional reduction in the EU oil consumption of 12 mtoe/year in 2020 
and 14 mtoe/year in 2025. With the steeper 2025 targets, the corresponding declines in the ES78 
and ES68 scenarios are 18 and 20 mtoe/year in 2025.  
Based on the projected oil price of around $75/barrel in 2020 and $80/barrel in 2025, we can 
estimate fuel expenditure savings in the Current ES scenario, which we find to be about 
€5.9 billion ($6.7 billion at the current exchange rates) in 2020 and about €7.1 billion 
($8.2 billion) in 2025. Higher emission targets in 2025 would save more in reduced oil payments 
(€9.1 billion Euro in ES78 and €10.4 billion Euro in ES68), but as we show later, they would also 
cost more. 
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Figure 2. On-road fuel consumption for an average new car and total fleet. 
 
Figure 3. CO2 mandates for new cars based on the test cycle (“test cycle”), on-road CO2 emissions for an 
average new car (“new fleet”), and total fleet (“total fleet”).  
Table 3. Oil use (mtoe) in the No Policy scenario and reduction in oil use (mtoe) with alternative policy 
instruments. 
  No Policy,  Oil Use (mtoe) 
Emission Trading,  
Oil Use Reduction (mtoe) 
Emission Standards,  
Oil Use Reduction (mtoe) 
2015 562 17.2 20.8 
2020 547 22.7 34.9 
2025 552 55.1 see below 
Current ES   69.1 
ES78   73.0 
ES68     75.4 
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Table 4. Economy-wide and vehicle CO2 emissions reductions under alternative policies. 
  Economy-wide emissions MtCO2 
Reduction in Vehicle Emissions from No Policy 
MtCO2 
  No Policy With Policy Emission Trading Emission Standards 
2015 3679 3525 15 30 
2020 3605 3385 18 65 
2025 3638 3123 28 see below 
Current ES     86 
ES78     102 
ES68       112 
 
Turning to CO2 emissions in the policy scenarios, our simulation approach assures that a 
consistent EU-wide emissions target is achieved in both the Emission Trading and Current ES 
scenarios; however, private vehicles emission differ. In the Emission Trading scenario vehicle 
emissions are reduced by 18 million tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) in 2020 and 28 MtCO2 in 2025 
(Table 4). The Current ES scenario in 2020 forces an additional 47 MtCO2, for a total reduction 
from vehicles nearly 4 times that in the Emission Trading scenario. However, given the structure 
of the scenarios, that means the greater vehicle emissions reduction under the Current ES allows 
higher emissions in other sectors. We also observe that emission reductions from private cars are 
relatively modest compared to the total EU CO2 emissions of about 3,100–3,400 MtCO2 in 
2020–2025. The total reduction from vehicles in Current ES compared with No Policy is only 
about 2% of economy-wide emissions. 
Potential emission reductions due to the displacement of petroleum-based fuels are partially 
offset by increases in vehicle travel due to the reduced cost per mile (a result of both higher 
vehicle efficiency and reduced fuel cost). We consider the cost effectiveness of achieving these 
reductions relative to an efficient instrument targeting CO2 in the next section.  
4.3. Economic Impacts 
We report economic impacts in terms of changes in macroeconomic consumption where it is 
the same concept as in the well-recognized definition of GDP: 
GDP = C (consumption) + I (investment) + G (government) +X (exports) –M (imports) 
As evaluated within the model, an annual consumption change is equal to the annual welfare 
change, measured as equivalent variation. For a discussion of the relationship among these 
different cost concepts see Paltsev and Capros, (2013). Macroeconomic consumption changes 
are the net effect of the policy, accounting for the increase in vehicle manufacturing costs less 
any fuel savings, as well as effects of broader changes in allocative efficiency caused by the 
policy. The broader changes include such things as changes in other prices in the economy, 
investment, terms of trade effects, and reduction in fuel tax revenue. For example, more 
expensive vehicles require more saving going toward purchase of the vehicle, thus squeezing out 
other investment and adding to the cost of the policy. As another example, reduced demand for 
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oil leads to a reduction in the world oil price, and since Europe is a net oil importer it benefits 
from this lower price. These international changes in price are more broadly referred to as 
changes in the terms of trade. Given the interdependencies of these effects it is impossible to 
completely separate them. Paltsev et al. (2007) offer a more detailed discussion of direct and 
indirect costs of climate policy. 
We find on balance net consumption costs for both the Emission Trading and Current ES 
when compared with the No Policy scenario (Table 5). Emission Trading has a net cost of 
€2 billion in 2015, rising to about €5 billion in 2020, and to about €8 billion in 2025. Adding the 
vehicle mandates in Current ES increases the costs by €0.7 billion in 2015 (to €2.7 billion), and 
by €12.3 billion in 2020 (to €17.2 billion). By 2025 the additional consumption losses about 
double to €24.1 billion from the 2020 level of losses in Current ES even though the emissions 
target only falls from 98 g/km in 2020 to 95 g/km. Among factors leading to this strong jump in 
costs is continuing growth in the economy, and the crowding out of investment along the entire 
scenario that gradually slows economic growth—an effect that accumulates over time. With 
projected new car sales in the EU at about 13 million per year, the €12 billion added cost in 2020 
in Current ES means the standards amount to an additional cost of about €925 Euro per new car 
sold. This is a consumption loss divided by number of vehicles sold, and is hence net of fuel 
savings and includes other indirect economic costs (and benefits such as from terms of trade 
changes).  
Table 5. Policy costs (in billion Euro/year) of reaching the same CO2 targets with alternative policy 
instruments. 
Emission Trading 
bn €/year 
Emission Standards 
bn €/year 
2015 2.0 2.7 
2020 4.9 17.2 
2025 8.2 see below 
Current ES 32.2 
ES78 50.7 
ES68 70.9 
While economy-wide emissions are identical in both Current ES and Emission Trading, it is 
instructive to divide the total cost by the total emissions reduction to get an average cost per ton 
of emissions reduction. Combining information from Table 4 on the total economy-wide 
emission reduction of 220 MtCO2 and the costs of €4.9 billion and €17.2 billion reported in 
Table 5, we can compare the average economy-wide costs of CO2. With €22 per tonne in the 
Emission Trading scenario and €78 per tonne in the Current ES scenario, this makes the current 
standards about 3.5 times more costly. Even more informative is an average cost of additional 
emission reductions in vehicles. For 2020 the additional vehicle emissions reductions are 
47 MtCO2 (18 MtCO2 in the Emission Trading scenario vs. 65 MtCO2 in the Current ES 
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scenario) at an added cost of €12.3 billion, making the average cost of this reduction about €260  
per tonne of CO2. Comparing these gives another sense of the economic inefficiency of the 
mandates.  
As noted earlier, current mandates for vehicles are specified only to 2021. In the Current ES 
scenario we assumed this standard remained unchanged in 2025. Scenarios ES78 and ES68 allow 
us to estimate the costs of the tighter targets under discussion for 2025 (EPRS, 2014). As shown 
in Table 4, the costs are significant—€50.7 billion (€42.5 billion more than Emission Trading) in 
ES78 and €70.9 billion (€62.7 billion more) in ES68. These tighter standards come at ever-higher 
costs per ton of emissions reduction. The average cost of the 16 MtCO2 of additional reduction 
in ES78 (beyond Current ES in 2025) is €1,125 per tonne of CO2; the average cost of the 
10 billion tonnes of additional reduction in ES68 (beyond ES78) is €2,020 per tonne of CO2. 
Compared with the average cost per ton reduced with emissions trading, this calculation helps to 
indicate the degree of inefficiency created by the vehicle emissions mandates. 
Government tax revenues are reduced in the policy scenarios because the policies reduce 
overall economic activity and fuel use, which is a significant source of government revenue in 
Europe. An argument can be made that tax revenue neutrality should be enforced to estimate the 
full policy cost. This could be accomplished by raising tax rates to compensate for revenue lost 
due to the declining tax base. Higher tax rates will generally lead to higher welfare costs, but the 
total additional cost will depend on which taxes are raised (Rausch et al., 2010). Gitiaux et al. 
(2012) showed that tax reform reducing the very high fuel taxes in Europe and replacing the 
revenue with other taxes could actually improve welfare. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
We find that in comparison to emission trading, the vehicle mandates in 2020 reduce the CO2
emissions from transportation by about 50 MtCO2 and lower oil expenditures by about 
€6 billion, but the vehicle emission standards cost an additional €12 billion in 2020 (net of fuel 
savings and terms of trade benefits). Keeping the 2021 mandates unchanged for 2025 leads to the 
EU consumption loss of about €24 billion in 2025. Increasing the emission targets further to  
78–68g/km leads to an annual consumption loss of €40–63 billion in 2025. In percentage terms, 
emissions trading results in a 0.08% loss in macroeconomic consumption in 2025. Adding 
vehicle emission standards increases the loss to 0.69% and leads to no greater reduction in 
economy-wide CO2 emissions. The vehicle emission standards do result in a greater reduction in 
petroleum use, one of the goals of broader energy policy in Europe. We estimated the additional 
petroleum reduction to be about 12 mtoe in 2020, or about 2% of total petroleum use in Europe. 
This rises to about 14 mtoe in 2025, or about 2.5% of petroleum use, by which time the standards 
are fully phased in (although the old car fleet has not been fully replaced). Our analysis was 
based on technical studies of vehicle efficiency improvements conducted in the US. Ideally, we 
would base our vehicle cost and efficiency estimates on an assessment of the specific types 
vehicles sold in Europe, but no comparably detailed assessment has been conducted.  
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The motivation for separate sectoral policies, especially on vehicles, is often that an 
economy-wide carbon price will not induce a significant reduction in fuel use, and the sector 
ought to contribute a “fair share” of the economy-wide reduction.  Our analysis suggests that 
policies that require greater emissions reductions from sectors that otherwise might not reduce as 
much incur a hefty toll on the economy. By contrast, market-based instruments that allow greater 
emissions reductions in sectors where they cost less shrink the economic pie by a substantially 
smaller margin.  
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